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WHAT HAPPENED—AND WHAT IS 
HAPPENING—TO THE  
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE? 
Jeffrey L. Fisher* 
INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Davis v. Washington,1 like 
in Crawford v. Washington2 before it, is obviously the product 
of compromise. I do not mean to suggest that any Justices 
switched or traded votes to reach greater unanimity in the two 
cases decided in the Davis opinion. Rather, the opinion contains 
multiple and somewhat distinct threads of reasoning that do not 
naturally fit together and, therefore, that presumably reflect 
different Justices’ divergent theoretical points of view. So the 
question remains: when exactly do statements made by victims 
or other witnesses, in close proximity to potentially criminal 
activity, trigger the Confrontation Clause? 
This much we know: the Confrontation Clause gives 
defendants the right to be confronted with the “witnesses” 
against them—in other words—with those persons whose 
“testimony” the prosecution offers against defendants.3 In order 
to safeguard this right, the Clause prohibits the prosecution from 
                                                          
* Associate Professor of Law (Teaching), Stanford Law School. The 
historical portions of this paper are drawn to a substantial degree from the 
brief I filed for the petitioner in Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266 
(2006). In that respect, I thank Lissa Shook for her assistance in researching 
and crafting that brief. 
1 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006). 
2 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
3 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
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introducing out-of-court “testimonial” statements unless the 
declarants are unavailable and defendants had a prior 
opportunity to cross examine them.4 
Statements a person makes in response to police questioning 
at the stationhouse are testimonial.5 In addition, the Court held 
in Hammon v. Indiana, one of the two cases resolved in the 
Davis opinion, that accusatory statements that a woman made in 
response to police officers’ initial inquiries upon responding to 
the scene of a suspected assault—while the woman was no 
longer in immediate danger—were testimonial.6 
By contrast, the Court also held in Davis v. Washington, the 
other case resolved in the Davis opinion, that statements a 
woman made to a 911 operator describing an ongoing domestic 
disturbance and identifying her alleged assailant as he fled were 
not testimonial, although the Court advised that “[i]t could 
readily be maintained” that statements she made later in the call, 
once the alleged assailant drove away from the premises, were 
testimonial.7 The Court in Davis also laid down a generalized 
test for cases such as these: 
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the 
course of police interrogation under circumstances 
objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the 
interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an 
ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the 
circumstances objectively indicate that there is no 
such ongoing emergency, and that the primary 
purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove 
past events potentially relevant to later criminal 
prosecution.8 
There is much murkiness in the many components of that 
proffered dichotomy. And that murkiness does not dissipate 
when one digs into the opinion. The Court employed three 
                                                          
4 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. 
5 Id. at 53. 
6 Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2278-79. 
7 Id. at 2276-77. 
8 Id. at 2273-74. 
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dominant strains of reasoning to elucidate and apply its 
dichotomy—each of which, at least at first glance, does not seem 
entirely consistent with the others. First, the Court distinguished 
statements given during an “ongoing emergency” from those 
given after such an emergency was over.9 Second, the Court 
distinguished between statements describing “what is happening” 
from those describing “what happened.”10 Third, the Court 
distinguished between statements that do not operate as “‘a 
weaker substitute for live testimony’ at trial” from those that do 
align with their “courtroom analogues”—in other words, the 
Court distinguished those statements that do not function like 
witness testimony from those that “do precisely what a witness 
does on direct examination.”11 
In the six months following Davis, most courts have relied 
primarily, if not exclusively, on the emergency/nonemergency 
dichotomy to resolve cases involving fact patterns that fall in 
between the two situations that Davis involved.12 Some courts 
have relied on the past/present dichotomy.13 No court has relied 
on the “what-a-witness-does” test. 
This preference for the emergency idea is understandable. 
We have entered a brave new world of confrontation 
jurisprudence in which virtually no judges have experience 
applying even its basic governing principles. It makes sense that 
judges gravitate toward a concept that at least seems to strike a 
familiar note with respect to other areas of criminal procedure. 
For example, the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement 
contains an exception for “exigent circumstances,”14 and the 
Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause allows the 
                                                          
9 Id.; compare Id. at 2276 (stating that declarant in Davis “was facing an 
ongoing emergency” at the beginning of the call) with id. at 2277 (“the 
emergency appears to have ended” when Davis drove away); id. at 2278 
(“[t]here was no emergency in progress” when Amy Hammon spoke to 
police officers). 
10 See id. at 2276-78. 
11 Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2277-78 (emphasis added). 
12 See infra notes 91-100 and accompanying text. 
13 See infra notes 91-95 and accompanying text. 
14 See infra note 101 and accompanying text (discussing this exception). 
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government to introduce confessions police obtain without 
Miranda warnings when the police interrogated the suspect in 
the midst of a public safety emergency.15 Furthermore, the 
unadorned concept of an emergency is flexible enough that many 
appellate courts can recite it, comfortable in the knowledge that 
as a test, it will not stand in the way of reaching their desired, 
pre-Crawford result: upholding the admission of absent victims’ 
statements alleging potentially criminal behavior, often some 
kind of domestic violence. 
But this Article contends, however, that the emergency/non-
emergency dichotomy is the wrong touchstone for resolving 
disputes over statements describing fresh criminal activity. It 
does so by drawing on history to make sense of the Davis 
opinion. While the aggressive prosecution of domestic violence 
cases gives this issue a modern urgency, the problem of whether 
to admit statements describing fresh criminal activity is hardly 
new. In particular, prosecutors in the nineteenth century 
frequently tried to introduce statements by victims who had just 
been assaulted, shot or stabbed (but who did not think they were 
so seriously wounded as to be giving dying declarations). Courts 
resolved disputes over the admissibility of these statements 
exclusively by reference to the past/present dichotomy—or as it 
was known then, the res gestae doctrine. Under the res gestae 
doctrine, statements describing ongoing activity were admissible, 
but statements concerning completed events were not.16 It is that 
doctrine that not only properly carries the right to confrontation 
forward to the post-Crawford era, but also that best synthesizes 
the various strands of the Davis opinion itself. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I surveys courts’ 
historical treatment of fresh descriptions of potentially criminal 
events, focusing especially on courts’ development of the res 
gestae doctrine. This part makes clear that the res gestae 
doctrine, contrary to some current assumptions, was more than 
simply a hearsay principle; rather, it was deeply rooted in 
confrontation law and values. Part II demonstrates that the res 
                                                          
15 See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984). 
16 See infra notes 32-53 and accompanying text. 
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gestae doctrine best synthesizes the various strands of Davis 
and, indeed, provides the only coherent and workable rule for 
administering the Confrontation Clause in cases falling in 
between the two fact patterns described in Davis. Part III offers 
some final thoughts on the implications of grounding Davis in its 
res gestae rhetoric. Not only should this doctrinal recognition 
require some lower courts to scrutinize more rigorously cases 
involving fresh accusations, but it also should inform their 
analyses of cases involving other types of currently controversial 
hearsay statements, such as statements to medical personnel, 
private victims’ services organizations, and other private and 
quasi-private parties. 
I.  THE RES GESTAE DOCTRINE 
Ever since people have inflicted injuries upon other people, 
victims and witnesses of such acts have sought to report them to 
others as soon as possible—in order (among other reasons) to 
seek help, to assign blame, and to set in motion the process of 
law enforcement. A survey of courts’ historical treatment of 
such statements in criminal cases reveals that for decades, if not 
centuries, courts drew a sharp line between those statements that 
described ongoing events (or were made in immediate reaction 
to them), and those that narrated past occurrences. Furthermore, 
courts took this approach not just as a matter of hearsay law, but 
in order to safeguard the confrontation right. 
A.  Fresh Reports in the Founding Era 
Professional police forces did not exist during the Founding 
Era.17 Nevertheless, victims of alleged crimes during that period 
had opportunities—and often an obligation—to immediately 
                                                          
17 See, e.g., Steven Penney, Theories of Confession Admissibility: A 
Historical View, 25 AM. J. CRIM. L. 309, 314 (1998) (“Large-scale 
professional police forces did not exist prior to the latter half of the 
nineteenth century”); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53 (2004) 
(noting that “England did not have a professional police force until the 19th 
century”). 
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report felonious acts to local constables or bailiffs.18 Such an 
oral report was commonly called a “hue and cry.”19 These 
prompt reports, like reports to authorities in modern times, were 
taken very seriously: it was a crime in itself to give “false 
information” to a constable.20 A hue and cry, also like 911 calls 
and reports to responding police officers today, typically served 
a dual function of assisting in apprehending a potentially 
dangerous suspect and triggering a prospective criminal 
prosecution. As Sir Matthew Hale explained the situation in 
common law England: 
1. The party that levies [the hue and cry] ought to 
come to the constable of the vill[age], and give him 
notice of a felony committed, and give him such 
reasonable assurance thereof as the nature of the case 
will bear. 
2. If he knows the name of him that did it, he must 
tell the constable the same. 
3. If he knows it not, but can describe him, he must 
describe his person, or his habit, or his horse, or 
such circumstances that he knows, which may 
conduce to his discovery.21 
Constables, in turn, were required to use the information 
provided to orchestrate pursuits and arrests of suspects, and 
                                                          
18 See 2 SIR MATTHEW HALE, HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONAE: A 
HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 98-100 (1st Am. ed. 1847) 
[hereinafter 2 Hale]. 
19 Id. I am grateful to Tim O’Toole and others at the Public Defender 
Service of the District of Columbia for suggesting this historical parallel. 
20 Id. at 101; compare, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.84.040 (false 
reports to police unlawful); with State v. Hopkins, 117 P.3d 377, 384 (Wash. 
App. 2005) (Quinn-Brintnall, C.J., dissenting) (noting that false report 
statutes apply to 911 calls). 
21 2 Hale, supra note 18, at 100; see also 2 id. at 100 n.(c) (citing other 
sources in accord); 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of 
England 294 (1768) (“The party raising [a hue and cry] must acquaint the 
constable of the vill[age] with all the circumstances which he knows of the 
felony and the person of the felon.”). 
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sometimes to initiate investigations.22 
There can be little doubt that the substance of hues and cries 
would have been persuasive evidence in criminal prosecutions—
and sometimes critical evidence when declarants became 
unavailable to testify. Yet even though I detailed the hue and cry 
practice in my opening brief in Davis,23 none of the parties or 
amici to the litigation were able to uncover a single instance of a 
court allowing such an out-of-court statement to be introduced 
against a criminal defendant. 
In the few reported cases in which courts addressed the 
subject, English and American courts agreed that such 
statements could not be introduced without the declarant also 
testifying in court. For instance, in 1779, the King’s Bench held 
unanimously in King v. Brasier that an alleged victim’s 
complaint made to her mother “immediately upon coming 
home” from an alleged assault was inadmissible because “no 
testimony whatever may be legally received except upon oath” 
and the victim was “not sworn or produced as a witness on the 
trial.”24 A later English case ruled that a constable “could not be 
asked [at trial] what name [an alleged robbery victim] 
mentioned” when the victim reported the crime to him.25 
Finally, shortly after the Bill of Rights was adopted, South 
Carolina’s highest law court explained that: 
Charges for criminal offences are most generally 
                                                          
22 2 Hale, supra note 18 at 99-100; 4 Blackstone, Commentaries, at 294; 
see also 1 JAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 
224 (1883) (recounting case in which a murder victim’s butler “fetch[ed]” the 
local magistrate “just as he was going to bed” to bring him to the crime 
scene). 
23 See Brief for Petitioner at 18-19. 
24 King v. Brasier, 1 Leach 199, 200 (K.B. 1779). 
25 Henry Roscoe, A Digest of the Law of Evidence in Criminal Cases 23 
(3rd Am. ed. 1846) (describing Rex v. Wink, 172 Eng. Rep. 1293 (1834)). 
The judge in Wink did allow the constable to testify as to “whether, in 
consequence of the prosecutor [that is, the victim, since this was a private 
prosecution] mentioning a name to him, he went in search of any person and, 
if he did, who it was.” Wink, 172 Eng. Rep. at 1293. But it is unclear 
whether the victim testified at trial, so as to alleviate any confrontation 
concern this testimony would have raised. See id. 
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made by the party injured, and under the influence of 
the excitement incident to the wrong done, and 
however much inclined the witness may be to speak 
the truth, and the magistrate to do his duty in taking 
the examination, his evidence will receive a coloring 
in proportion to the degree of excitement under which 
he labors, which the judgement [sic] may detect, but 
which it is impossible exactly to describe, and we 
know too how necessary a cross examination is to 
elicit the whole truth from even a willing witness; 
and to admit such evidence without the means of 
applying the ordinary tests, would put in jeopardy the 
dearest interests of the community.26 
The strong implication of these passages is that neither the 
need to apprehend dangerous individuals nor the declarants’ 
“excitement” as a result of alleged injuries in any way exempted 
their statements reporting crimes to persons of authority from 
confrontation restrictions.27 The King’s Bench perceived such 
reports as “testimony,” and the South Carolina Court of Appeals 
spoke of the need to submit such reports to “the ordinary tests,” 
such as “cross examination.”  
But one can deduce only so much from three reported cases. 
This is especially so in light of the scant reporting style of early 
English cases and courts’ general hostility at the time to 
admitting any hearsay evidence whatsoever.28 It is necessary, 
                                                          
26 State v. Hill, 20 S.C.L. 607, 1835 WL 1416, at *2 (S.C. App. 1835). 
27 Indeed, it appears that hue and cry reports were not even thought to 
be a sufficient basis to impose pretrial restraints on a suspect’s liberty. In 
order to justify detaining a suspect in prison pending trial, the Marian bail 
and committal statutes required accusers to give statements under oath and 
subject to magistrates’ questioning. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44; Directions 
to Justices of the Peace, 84 Eng. Rep. 1055 (1708). When accusers later 
became unavailable for trial, prosecutors sometimes tried to introduce these 
examinations (though by the time of the Founding era, such examinations 
were admissible only if the defendant had been afforded the opportunity to 
cross-examine). See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 46-47 (2004). 
28 A prominent eighteenth century treatise on evidence proclaimed the 
general principle that “a mere Hearsay is no Evidence.” GEOFFREY GILBERT, 
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therefore, to look slightly ahead in time in order to fill out this 
picture. 
B.  The Nineteenth Century Ripening of the Res Gestae 
Concept 
As the nineteenth century progressed, courts relaxed their 
attitudes somewhat toward hearsay evidence, to the point where 
they allowed several exceptions to the rule.29 At the same time, 
it became increasingly common for prosecutors to seek to 
introduce victims’ statements describing criminal conduct such 
as shootings, when the victims were unavailable to testify at 
trial. 
Whatever the reason for this uptick in reported cases,30 
courts’ resolutions of disputes over these fresh statements 
provides a window into how the common law right to 
confrontation (as incorporated into state law) was thought to 
operate in this context at the time. It is safe to assume that 
courts would not have applied any hearsay exception to permit 
testimonial evidence to be introduced in criminal cases because 
they would have thought doing so would contravene the right to 
confrontation.31 Indeed, some courts explicitly relied on 
                                                          
THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 99 (Garland Pub. 1979) (1754). To the extent that 
any hearsay exceptions were truly established prior to the Founding, not a 
single criminal procedure or evidence treatise suggested that out-of-court 
statements describing criminal conduct were admissible, no matter how 
contemporaneously made with the event described. See, e.g., THOMAS 
PEAKE, A COMPENDIUM ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 8 (1801) (listing hearsay 
exceptions and not mentioning anything related to spontaneous declarations). 
29 See Wigmore on Evidence § 1420 (collecting several decisions from 
the nineteenth century extolling the value of creating exceptions to the 
hearsay rule). 
30 It may have been, interestingly enough, due in part to the advent of 
the handgun industry; Smith & Wesson opened its doors in 1852 and began 
mass-marketing handguns shortly thereafter. See Roy G. Jenks, History of 
Smith & Wesson (10th ed. 1977); About Smith and Wesson, 
http://www.smith-wesson.com (follow “About Us” hyperlink; then follow 
“View History” hyperlink). 
31 See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 (2004) (“There is scant 
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confrontation principles in resolving these cases. 
In the early nineteenth century, English and American 
treatises formally began to divide statements that were, in the 
words of one treatise, “part of the res gestae,” in which a 
statement “is itself a fact,” from those that were “mere oral 
assertion[s].”32 As another treatise put it: contemporaneous 
declarations “respecting the motives or objects he had in view of 
doing” the act were admissible, but assertions made “subsequent 
to the doing the acts” were not.33 If a statement merely related 
or narrated a past occurrence, it fell outside the res gestae.34 
Rich Friedman and Bridget McCormack have explained how 
the res gestae concept interlocks with the common law right to 
confrontation—and specifically with the traditional insistence that 
witness testimony be given subject to cross examination.35 But 
Professor Friedman’s and Professor McCormack’s research 
covering the nineteenth century concerned almost exclusively 
civil cases. As a result, they could only speculate that the right 
to confrontation was actually a driving force causing courts to 
distinguish between statements that were a part of ongoing 
events from those that described purely past events.36 
                                                          
evidence” that courts at the time of the Founding invoked any hearsay 
exceptions “to admit testimonial statements against the accused in a criminal 
case.”); see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905 (1997) (detailing 
that the government’s failure to use a “highly attractive” practice for years 
following the Founding gives “reason to believe” the practice was considered 
unconstitutional). 
32 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 
368 n.25 (J. Chitty ed. 1826). See also 2 JOSEPH GABBETT, A TREATISE ON 
CRIMINAL LAW 468 (1843) (finding statement admissible if it was “itself a 
part of the transaction” but not if it is offered to prove “a distinct fact”). 
33 EUSTACHIUS STRICKLAND, A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE 397 (1830). 
34 1 FRANCIS WHARTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN 
CRIMINAL ISSUES § 266, 691 (“The rule before us, however, does not permit 
the introduction under the guise of res gestae of a narrative of past events, 
made after events are closed.”). 
35 Richard D. Friedman & Bridget McCormack, Dial-In Testimony, 150 
U. PA. L. REV. 1171, 1212-17 (2002). 
36 See id. at 1216 (“We suspect that, though the courts generally spoke 
in terms of the accuracy of statements, another consideration  [namely, the 
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A thorough review of criminal cases in the latter part of the 
nineteenth century makes it clear that courts rigorously 
scrutinized the temporal nature of fresh reports of potentially 
criminal conduct with an eye toward safeguarding the right to 
confrontation. Courts allowed witnesses at trial to recount 
victims’ cries for help and identifications of their attackers made 
while the declarants were being attacked.37 But courts did not 
allow hearsay statements into evidence when the statements did 
nothing more than describe completed events. In one case from 
California,38 for instance, a police officer ran 140 yards to the 
scene of a shooting that had just occurred, where the victim told 
the officer that the defendant had shot her. The victim died 
before trial,39 so the prosecutor put the officer on the stand to 
repeat the victim’s statement. The California Supreme Court 
held that the statement was inadmissible. Invoking Wharton’s 
Treatise on Criminal Evidence—the leading authority at the 
time—the California Supreme Court explained that “narrative[s] 
of past events, made after the events are closed” fall outside of 
the res gestae and that “[a]t the time the [victim’s declaration] 
was made, the shooting had been done, and the assailant had 
escaped the scene of the shooting.”40 In other words, “[t]he 
declaration was not the fact talking through the party, but the 
party’s talk about the facts.”41 As such, it could not be used as 
substantive evidence against the accused. 
Courts treated reports to private parties (which were much 
more common) the same way. In one typical case, a man was 
shot in his home. A few minutes later, family members and 
friends responded to help him. He told them to “[g]o for a 
doctor,” and then, in response to someone’s question, identified 
                                                          
confrontation right’s requirement that testimony be given subject to cross-
examination] tended to motivate them.”). 
37 See Crookham v. State, 5 W. Va. 510 (1871). 
38 People v. Wong Ark, 30 P. 1115 (1892). 
39 It is unclear when the victim died, but the California Supreme Court 
expressly held that the victim’s statement “was not admissible as a dying 
declaration.” Id. at 1115. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 1115-16. 
FISHER 6/22/2007 1:09 AM 
598 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
his shooter. The victim subsequently died, and the prosecutor 
moved to include the victim’s statements at trial. The Indiana 
Supreme Court held that the latter statements constituted “no 
part of the res gestae, and were not admissible as such,” 
explaining: 
It can not, with any propriety, be said, that the 
statements made by the deceased, after the crime had 
been fully completed, that Prince Jones shot him, 
served in any degree to illustrate the character of the 
main fact, the shooting. They were the simple 
statements of the deceased, narrative of what had 
already transpired, and important only as indicating 
the person by whom the main fact had been 
perpetrated. 
. . . . 
We attach no special significance to the fact that the 
declarations were made, not contemporaneously with, 
but a few minutes after, the shooting, further than 
that it shows, in connection with the substance of the 
statements, that they were purely narrative of what 
had already transpired.42 
A statement, in sum, saying, “Prince Jones, don’t shoot me!” 
may have been admissible, but telling a third party that “Prince 
Jones just shot me” was not. 
Numerous other homicide and similar cases during this 
period reached analogous results, making clear that it was 
irrelevant whether an accusatory statement “was made so soon 
after the occurrence as to exclude the presumption that it has 
been fabricated” or whether “it was made under such 
circumstances as to compel the conviction of its truth.”43 Nor 
did it matter whether a victim’s statement was made moments 
after an incident “with a view to the apprehension of the 
                                                          
42 Jones v. State, 71 Ind. 66, 8-9 (as cited by Westlaw) (1880). 
43 Mayes v. State, 1 So. 733, 735 (Miss. 1877); see also State v. 
Carlton, 48 Vt. 636, 643 (1876) (finding it was irrelevant whether statement 
was made “so soon after that the party had not time, probably, to imagine or 
concoct a false account”). 
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offender.”44 If a victim’s statement identified the perpetrator of a 
“completed” criminal act, most courts held that the statement, 
“however nearly contemporaneous with the occurrence,” fell 
outside the res gestae and was strictly inadmissible.45 Thus, 
courts excluded not only victims’ reports of who had just shot 
them,46 but also bystanders’ fresh reports of such events;47 
victims’ statements identifying their assailants moments after 
being stabbed;48 a robbery victim’s statement identifying the 
perpetrator “directly after” an attack;49 and other assault 
victims’ statements moments after receiving their injuries and 
identifying their attackers.50 
There were some state courts that did not define the res 
gestae concept quite as tightly as the majority did.51 In a much 
                                                          
44 People v. Ah Lee, 60 Cal. 85, 92 (1882); see also State v. Davidson, 
30 Vt. 377, 384 (1858) (noting that a statement suggesting need to pursue 
suspect inadmissible). 
45 Davidson, 30 Vt. at 384-85. 
46 In addition to the cases just discussed, see State v. Estoup, 39 La. 
Ann. 219, 221 (La. 1887) (shooting victim’s statement “a few minutes after 
receiving the wound”). 
47 Elder v. Arkansas, 65 S.W. 938, 939 (Ark. 1901) (describing a case 
in which a bystander made a statement to the responding police, one hour 
after the shooting occurred and the assailant had fled). 
48 Mayes, 1 So. at 735-36; see also Ah Lee, 60 Cal. at 89-91; Kraner v. 
State, 61 Miss. 158, 161 (1883). 
49 Davidson, 30 Vt. at 384-85. 
50 State v. Pomeroy, 25 Kan. 349, 350-51 (1881); Parker v. State, 35 
N.E. 1105 (Ind. 1894) (finding a statement made by the deceased 
inadmissible because it reported a past occurrence, even though the statement 
was made to his wife immediately after the attack, as she was running 
downstairs to assist him); State v. Hendricks, 73 S.W. 194 (Mo. 1903) 
(discussing statement of assault victim upon returning home and describing 
assault to his wife fell outside res gestae because it was unconnected to event: 
“No one can read that statement and denominate it anything else than a 
narrative. It sounds just like the narrative of a difficulty months after it 
occurred.”). 
51 See State v. Murphy, 17 A. 998 (1889) (holding that statements that 
were made 30 seconds and 10-15 minutes after the assault were admissible as 
within res gestae because “they were uttered after the lapse of so brief an 
interval, and in such connection with the principal transaction as to form a 
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criticized decision, for instance, the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court upheld the admission of a stabbing victim’s 
statement identifying his assailant after he ran to his neighbor’s 
apartment upstairs to seek help.52 Nonetheless, even these courts 
                                                          
legitimate part of it, and to receive credit and support as one of the 
circumstances which accompanied and illustrated the main fact which was the 
subject of inquiry before the jury”); State v. Robinson, 27 So. 129, 130-31 
(La. 1900) (describing statement made thirty seconds after shooting); Kirby 
v. Commonwealth, 77 Va. 681 (1883) (describing declarations made probably 
within two minutes, after the shot was fired); Territory v. Callaghan, 6 P. 
49, 54-55 (Utah 1885) (statement a few seconds after shooting); State v. 
Morrison, 68 P. 48, 51 (Kan. 1902) (detailing reports taking place three to 
five minutes after stabbing to first responders); Commonwealth v. Werntz, 29 
A. 272 (1894) (reporting statement to police surgeon a few minutes after 
stabbing). 
52 See Commonwealth v. McPike, 3 Cush. 181 (Mass. 1849); accord 
Commonwealth v. Hackett, 2 Allen 136 (Mass. 1861) (applying McPike to 
another case). McPike was roundly criticized as without legal or logical 
foundation. See 1 FRANCIS WHARTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL ISSUES § 262, at 503 & n.14 (10th ed. 1912) (stating 
that McPike “cannot be sustained” and that “[t]he better rule is that when the 
transaction is over, no matter how short may have been in the interval, and 
the assailant is absent, declarations by the assailed . . . are not part of the res 
gestae”); Binns v. State, 57 Ind. 46, 51 (1877) (showing same and refusing 
to follow McPike); Mayes, 1 So. at 734-35 (same); Ah Lee, 60 Cal. at 88-92 
(same). The Texas Court of Appeals also took a very broad view of the res 
gestae doctrine. See Irby v. State, 7 S.W. 705, 706 (Tex. App. 1888) 
(describing statement given to father 15 to 20 minutes after shooting 
admissible); Kenney v. State, 79 S.W. 817, 819 (Tex. Ct. App. 1903) 
(describing case in which a child’s report to mother several minutes after 
rape was admissible). But the high court in Texas never endorsed these 
rulings, and no other court ever treated them—grounded, as they were, 
exclusively in Texas precedent—as authoritative. 
 A lone English criminal case also suggested that a statement describing a 
recently completed incident might be admissible, see Rex v. Foster, 6 Car. & 
P. 325 (1834), but it, too, met with a strong rebuke. See also, 1 Horace 
Smith, Roscoe’s Digest of the Law of Evidence in Criminal Cases 28 (8th 
Am. ed. 1888) (describing that a broad reading of the decision is “difficult to 
reconcile with established principles”). In a subsequent English case, a court 
made clear that the res gestae rule remained strict. There, a victim, no more 
than one or two minutes after having her throat cut, exclaimed to her aunt 
(who was just outside the house), “See what Harry has done!” The court 
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agreed with the majority of state courts concerning the 
governing standard, as encapsulated by Wharton’s treatise: 
The res gestae may be (therefore) defined as those 
circumstances which are the automatic and 
undisguised incidents of a particular litigated act, and 
which are admissible when illustrative of such act. 
These incidents may be separated from the act by a 
lapse of time more or less appreciable. They may 
consist, as we will see, of sayings and doings of any 
one absorbed in the event, whether participant or 
bystander. They may comprise things left undone, as 
well as things done. In other words, they must stand 
in immediate causal relation to the act—a relation not 
broken by the interposition of voluntary individual 
wariness, seeking to manufacture evidence for itself.53 
While some courts, in short, allowed that a report made 
immediately after a criminal event could be considered part of 
the res gestae, it was common ground that the report was 
admissible only to the extent it was necessarily considered part 
of the event, not the product of independent contemplation. 
There can be little doubt that the res gestae doctrine, as 
reflected in these cases, was shaped by a desire to protect the 
right to confrontation. One mid-century treatise explained that 
“[t]he principle of th[e] rule” rejecting all “hearsay reports of 
transactions given by persons not produced as witnesses is that 
such evidence requires credit to be given to a statement made by 
a person who is not subject to the ordinary tests enjoined by law 
for ascertaining the correctness and completeness of his 
                                                          
ruled the declaration inadmissible. The court explained that “[a]nything 
uttered by the [victim] at the time the act was being done would be 
admissible, as, for instance, if she had been heard to say something, as 
‘Don’t, Harry!’ But here it was something stated by her after it was all over, 
whatever it was, and after the act was completed.” Regina v. Bedingfield, 14 
Cox Crim. Cas. 341, 342-45 (Crown Ct. 1879). 
53 1 Wharton’s, Criminal Evidence, supra § 259. See Werntz, 29 A. at 
597 (citing this passage); Robinson, 27 So. at 132 (following Wharton’s 
treatise); Kirby, 77 Va. at 687 (same); McPike, 3 Cush. at 181 (statement fell 
inside res gestae because it was uttered “immediately after the occurrence”). 
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testimony”—namely, to “oath” and “cross-examination.”54 
Thus, in a case holding inadmissible a manslaughter victim’s 
statement identifying the alleged perpetrator moments after being 
shot, the Vermont Supreme Court made explicit what was 
implicit in the treatises and in many other opinions of the time: 
The wisdom and justice of this rule in the 
administration of criminal law must be apparent. The 
general rule is, that no evidence can be received 
against the prisoner except such as is taken in his 
presence . . . . [To] admit the declarations of the 
party injured, made in the absence of the party 
accused, and without the right of cross examination, 
at a period of time so far subsequent to the happening 
of the act or transaction about which the declarations 
are made that the party might have invented them, 
would be depriving the accused of one of the most 
important safeguards the law has given him for his 
protection.55 
Other courts invoked similar language.56 Even when a court 
                                                          
54 3 SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 124, 
at 148 (1842) [hereinafter Greenleaf]. 
55 Carlton, 48 Vt. at 643-44. 
56 See Harris v. State, 1 Tex. Ct. App. 74, 80-81 (1876) WL 9028 at *4 
(“The principle of the rule [excluding evidence outside the res gestae] is that 
such evidence requires credit to be given to a statement made by a person 
who is not subjected to the ordinary tests enjoined by the law for ascertaining 
the correctness and completeness of his testimony—namely, that oral 
testimony should be delivered in the presence of the court, or a magistrate, 
under the moral and legal sanctions of an oath, and where the moral and 
intellectual character, the motives and deportment, of the witness can be 
examined, and his capacity and opportunities for observation, and his 
memory, can be tested by a cross-examination.”); People v. Simonds, 19 
Cal. 275, 278 (1861) (“It is true that it has been sometimes said declarations 
of a party at the time of doing an act, which is legal evidence, are admissible 
as parts of the res gestae, but this rule does not apply to admit, as against 
third persons, declarations of a past fact, having the effect of criminating the 
latter. If so, any felon caught with stolen property might criminate an 
innocent man, by declaring that he obtained the property from such person, 
or that such third person was associated with the declarant in the criminal 
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with a more expansive view of the res gestae doctrine than most 
allowed the admission of an accusatory statement made 
immediately after the event at issue, it emphasized that this did 
not violate the defendant’s right to confrontation because what 
the declarant “said and did, in natural consequence of the 
principal transaction, become original evidence”—that is, 
contemporaneous with the transaction itself.57 Genuine res 
gestae statements, in short, may have been exempt from 
confrontation requirements, but courts were loathe to go any 
further. 
There was only one recognized exception (aside from dying 
declarations) to the prohibition against admitting declarations 
outside of the res gestae: in cases in which “a person ha[d] been 
in any way outraged”—most often in rape cases, but also 
apparently in other cases lacking any sexual component—the fact 
that this person made a complaint right after the event happened 
was admissible.58 Sometimes courts admitted only the fact that 
the alleged victim complained, and occasionally courts permitted 
the substance of such complaints to corroborate the victim’s trial 
testimony.59 
But this “outcry” exception actually proved the rule that 
introducing any declaration accusing someone of committing a 
completed criminal act implicated the right to confrontation. For 
it was settled that if the victim did not testify, evidence of the 
fresh complaint—even to a relative or friend—“was not 
admissible, and only the fact that a complaint was made could 
                                                          
fact.”). 
57 State v. Murphy, 17 A. 998, 999 (R.I. 1889). 
58 1 Horace Smith, ROSCOE’S DIGEST OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN 
CRIMINAL CASES 28 (8th Am. ed. 1888); see also 3 WILLIAM OLDNALL 
RUSSELL, TREATISE ON CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS 248-49 (9th ed. 1877). 
[hereinafter Russell] 
59 See Rex v. Clarke, 171 Eng. Rep. 633 (1817) (finding only fact of 
complaint admissible); Regina v. Walker, 174 Eng. Rep. 266 (1839) (same); 
Regina v. Osborne, 174 Eng. Rep. 622 (1842) (same); 3 Greenleaf, supra 
note 54, at § 213 (corroboration permissible); 3 Russell, supra  note 58 at 
249 (same). 
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be admitted.”60 Recall, for instance, the King’s Bench’s holding 
in Brasier that an alleged victim’s complaint made to her mother 
upon coming home from an alleged assault was inadmissible 
because the victim was “not sworn or produced as a witness on 
the trial.”61 Nearly a century later, an American court held that 
an alleged victim’s statements that her parents elicited soon after 
an alleged assault with intent to commit rape were inadmissible 
because the declarant did not testify and the statements were 
“not [made] in the presence of the accused.”62 It is hard to miss 
the confrontation rhetoric in these decisions. Thus, even as 
courts gradually discarded the supposition that victims of certain 
violent acts typically would complain right after they happened, 
they adhered to the restriction against introducing absent 
victims’ fresh complaints.63 
C.  The Modern Creation of the Excited Utterance Doctrine 
During the same time that courts in criminal cases were 
rigorously excluding absent declarant’s statements that reported 
past events⎯no matter how agitated or excited the declarant had 
                                                          
60 2 McCormick on Evidence § 272.1, at 223 (4th ed. 1992) (emphasis 
added); 3 Russell, supra note 58, at 249 (same); 3 Greenleaf, supra note 54, 
at § 213 (“The complaint constitutes no part of the res gestae . . . and where 
she is not a witness in the case, it is wholly inadmissible.”); Roscoe, supra 
note 25, at 23 (same). 
61 King v. Brasier, 1 Leach 199, 200 (K.B. 1779). 
62 Weldon v. State, 32 Ind. 81, 82 (1869). 
63 See Regina v. Guttridges, 173 Eng. Rep. 916 (1840) (finding fresh 
complaint to friend inadmissible because witness was not available to testify); 
Regina v. Megson, 173 Eng. Rep. 894 (1840) (describing where the 
complaint made “as soon as [alleged victim] returned home” was 
inadmissible “to [show] who committed the offence” because she did not 
testify at trial); People v. McGee, 1 Denio 19, 22-24 (N.Y. 1845) (reversing 
conviction because alleged victim’s complaint to housekeeper “immediately 
after the offense is supposed to have been perpetrated” was improperly 
admitted in light of fact alleged victim did not testify at trial); Hornbeck v. 
State, 35 Ohio St. 277, 280-81 (1879) (reversing conviction because alleged 
victim’s fresh complaint was introduced without her testifying at trial); Elmer 
v. State, 20 Ariz. 170 (1919) (same). 
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been⎯one must note for the sake of completeness that some 
courts in civil cases occasionally extended the scope of the res 
gestae doctrine to cover statements made, as the Supreme Court 
put it in Insurance Co. v. Mosley, “almost contemporaneously 
with [an injury’s] occurrence.”64 Instead of seriously arguing 
that such statements were—as the res gestae concept requires—
part of the events themselves, the Supreme Court justified the 
statements’ admission primarily on the ground that “[i]n the 
ordinary concerns of life, no one would doubt the truth” of 
declarations made shortly after disruptive events.65 A few late 
nineteenth century state criminal cases invoked similar 
reliability-based reasoning, albeit usually in decisions involving 
statements that the courts also legitimately deemed to be part of 
the underlying transactions.66 
Writing the first edition of his influential treatise in 1904, 
Wigmore recognized that decisions such as Mosley could not 
really be explained by the common-law res gestae doctrine.67 
But instead of rejecting these cases as strays, Wigmore accepted 
their results and advanced, for the first time, the notion that the 
“stress of nervous excitement . . . stills the reflective facilities” 
and renders statements under that condition “particularly 
trustworthy,” thereby warranting exemption from the hearsay 
rule.68 Even putting aside questions concerning the validity of 
Wigmore’s psychological assumptions,69 Wigmore’s treatise took 
                                                          
64 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 397, 408 (1869) (emphasis added). Not all courts 
did so, however. For state civil cases refusing into the twentieth century to 
extend the res gestae concept in this manner, see Friedman & McCormack, 
supra note 35, at notes 167-75 (citing various cases). 
65 Mosley, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 408. 
66 See, e.g., Territory v. Callaghan, 6 P. 49, 54 (Utah 1885) (noting that 
“[n]o time had elapsed for the fabrication of a story.”); Robinson, 27 So. at 
130 (finding no opportunity for “fabrication”). 
67 3 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE 
IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §§ 1745-47, at 2247-50 and § 1796, at 2320 
(1904). 
68 Id. § 1747, at 2250. 
69 For a synthesis of the criticisms of these assumptions, see Aviva 
Orenstein, “My God!”: A Feminist Critique of the Excited Utterance 
Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 85 CAL. L. REV. 159, 178-82 (1997). 
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two further steps that were simply wrong. 
First, Wigmore claimed that statements reporting past events 
while under the stress of excitement were comparable to the 
statement that the court admitted in the noted 1694 case of 
Thompson v. Trevanion,70 and thus that the idea of “excited 
utterances” had some historical pedigree. Thompson was a civil 
case in which the court upheld the admission of a woman’s 
declaration “immediat[ely] upon the hurt received, and before 
[she] had time to devise or contrive anything to her own 
advantage.”71 In contrast to Wigmore, most Founding-Era 
commentators did not take the case’s four-sentence nisi prius 
report to mean that the declarant’s statement was admitted in her 
absence to prove that the defendant injured her.72 But even if the 
statement was used this way, the court’s holding would have 
been a fairly standard res gestae ruling. The reporter’s phrase 
“immediat[ely] upon the hurt received”73 is most naturally read 
to mean that the statement was made so simultaneously with 
being injured that it was part of the event itself—the victim’s 
direct response to being assaulted.74 
                                                          
70 Skin. 402, 90 Eng. Rep. 179 (K.B. 1694). 
71 Id. 
72 One treatise assumed that the declarant’s statement simply described 
her injury and was not accusatory. See 3 Russell, supra note 58, at 248 & 
n.1. Another believed that the statement was admitted solely to show she 
complained but not to prove how it happened. See 1 THOMAS STARKIE, A 
PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, pt. II, § 30, at 149 (1826). 
Still another assumed that the declarant testified at trial, so that her out-of-
court statement was nothing more than corroborative evidence. See 
GEOFFREY GILBERT, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 108 (1754). See generally 
Insurance Co. v. Mosley, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 397, 418 (1869) (Clifford, J., 
dissenting) (noting that Thompson is “so imperfectly reported that [it] can 
hardly be said to be reliable”). 
73 90 Eng. Rep. at 179. 
74 Dictionaries during the Founding era support this interpretation. See A 
UNIVERSAL ETYMOLOGICAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1783) (defining 
“immediate” as “[w]hich follows without any thing coming between; that 
follows or happens presently; that acts without means”); COMPLETE AND 
UNIVERSAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1792) (“In such a state with respect to 
something else, as to have nothing in between; without any thing intervening; 
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Second, Wigmore did not distinguish between civil and 
criminal cases in advancing the new reliability-based hearsay 
exception for excited utterances. Wigmore openly acknowledged 
that, in contrast to classic res gestae statements, narrative 
statements describing actions that had just completed were 
“testimonial,” as he used that term.75 But even when such 
statements reported criminal acts to governmental agents, 
Wigmore did not perceive this as posing Confrontation Clause 
concerns in ensuing criminal prosecutions. He thought the 
Clause did “not prescribe what kinds of testimonial 
statements . . . shall be given infrajudicially”; this depended, in 
his view, exclusively “on the law of evidence for the time 
                                                          
not acting by second causes. Instant, or present, as applied to time.”). I am 
indebted to Rich Friedman for supplying this thought and this research. 
Indeed, courts as late as the 1880’s observed that reading Thompson to 
support the admissibility of an absent witness’s declaration describing a truly 
completed act for the truth of the matter asserted would have been “difficult 
to reconcile with established principles.” Smith, supra note 58, at 28; see 
also Mayes v. State, 1 So. 733, 734 (Miss. 1887) (refusing to interpret 
Thompson this way); People v. Ah Lee, 60 Cal. 85,  89 (Cal. 1882) (same). 
75 3 Wigmore, supra note 67 § 1746, at 2248-49; see also id. § 1796, at 
2320 (“[W]hat [courts] do in this instance is to admit extrajudicial assertions 
as testimony to the fact asserted.”) (emphasis added).  Wigmore explained: 
Whenever, therefore, an [excited] utterance is used as 
testimony that the fact asserted in it did occur as asserted, 
i.e., on the credit of the speaker as a credible person, it is 
being used testimonially, and is within the [general] 
prohibition of the Hearsay rule. 
Now this testimonial use is precisely the use that is made of 
the present class of statements. . . . [T]hey clearly do 
involve the testimonial use of the assertion to prove the 
truth of the fact asserted,—for example, when the injured 
person declares who assaulted him or whether the 
locomotive bell was rung, or when the bystander at an 
affray exclaims that the defendant shot first. Such statements 
are genuine instances of using a hearsay assertion 
testimonially; i.e., we believe that Doe shot the pistol, or 
that the bell was rung, because the declarant so asserts—
which is essentially the feature of all human testimony. 
3 Wigmore, supra note 67, at §1746, at 2249 (first emphasis added). 
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being.”76 
Crawford, however, expressly rejected Wigmore’s toothless 
view of the Confrontation Clause77 and held that the 
Confrontation Clause does not depend on “the vagaries of the 
rules of evidence, much less [on] amorphous notions of 
‘reliability.’”78 Therefore, while the perceived reliability of 
certain out-of-court statements describing completed events 
afforded a legitimate theoretical basis in cases beyond the reach 
of the Sixth Amendment to allow the admission of such 
statements, the excited utterance exception has nothing to teach 
us about the scope of the Confrontation Clause. Only the res 
gestae concept was developed in order to interlock with 
constitutional restrictions respecting the introduction of out-of-
court testimony against criminal defendants. 
II.  THE DAVIS OPINION 
It is readily apparent that Davis fits within the common-law 
res gestae tradition. The Court explicitly held that statements 
describing to agents of law enforcement “what happened” are 
testimonial, but that statements describing “what is happening” 
are not.79 To be sure, I argued in the case that the Court should 
define the “what is happening” category narrowly—limiting it, 
as many courts did at common law, to statements describing the 
alleged crime itself in progress.80 But the Court, consistent with 
the other courts’ broader construction that the res gestae concept 
encapsulates not only statements describing events in progress, 
but also those made immediately after in direct consequence to 
such events,81 held that the 911 caller’s statements describing 
events as the assailant fled were not testimonial. 
The Court also defended its ruling on two other grounds. 
                                                          
76 Id. § 1397, at 1755. 
77 See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50-51, 67-68 (2004). 
78 Id. at 61. 
79 Id. at 2278. 
80 See Brief for Petitioner at 12. 
81 See supra  notes 51-53 and accompanying text. 
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First, the Court emphasized that police statements elicited in 
order to address an “ongoing emergency” are not testimonial, 
but that when no such emergency exists and police elicit 
statements for investigatory purposes, statements are 
testimonial.82 Second, the Court explained that statements that 
“do precisely what a witness does on direct examination” are 
testimonial, while those that do not align with any courtroom 
analogues are not.83 But, as I shall now contend, neither of these 
ideas, viewed in isolation, has force as an organizing principle 
for confrontation jurisprudence. Only by understanding the 
Davis opinion through the prism of the res gestae doctrine can 
the opinion’s otherwise loose strands be synthesized. 
A.  “Ongoing Emergency” 
Consider first the concept of an “ongoing emergency.”84 
Other than offering the label, the Court tells us very little about 
what constitutes an ongoing emergency. So perhaps the best 
indicators can be found in the actual results of Davis and 
Hammon v. Indiana, its companion case. 
The Court in Davis held that an ongoing emergency existed 
while the 911 caller described her alleged assailant in action. 
But the Court also indicated in rather explicitly worded dicta 
that as soon as “Davis drove away from the premises” and the 
operator asked the caller to describe how the alleged assault had 
begun and progressed, the caller’s statements were testimonial.85 
(By viewing Appendix A, a transcript of the entire 911 call, the 
reader can see exactly where the Court suggests the caller’s 
statements became testimonial.) 
What changed in this flash of an instant? Certainly not the 
fact that the caller was in danger or that a suspected felon was 
on the loose. Rather, the Court tells us that the caller switched 
from describing events “as they were actually happening” to 
                                                          
82 Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2273-74, 2276-78. 
83 Id. at 2277-78 (emphasis added). 
84 Id. at 2273-74. 
85 Id. at 2277. 
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describing “what happened in the past.”86 In other words, the 
statements elicited at the beginning of the call “describe[d] 
current circumstances,” while those at the end “describe[d] past 
events.”87 
The Court also held in Hammon that no ongoing emergency 
existed where the police questioned a suspected recent victim of 
domestic violence while other officers detained her husband in 
the next room. Although Justice Thomas noted in his dissent that 
the violence that the officers suspected had just occurred might 
have resumed if the officers had left without doing anything,88 
the eight-Justice majority “easi[ly]” concluded that no ongoing 
emergency existed while the officers questioned the suspected 
victim because there was no “immediate threat” or disturbance 
in progress.89 
This strong res gestae orientation requires us to take a closer 
look at the curious phrase “ongoing emergency.” The phrase 
brings to mind a scene in the movie A Few Good Men. Jack 
Nicholson, the colonel at a military base where a marine had 
been killed, testifies at the resulting court marshal that he 
believed before the killing that the marine had been in danger. 
Tom Cruise, the lawyer cross-examining him, asks whether 
Nicholson means that the marine had been in “grave danger.” 
Nicholson replies, “Is there any other kind?” One might ask the 
same question about an “ongoing emergency.” Doesn’t the 
presence of an emergency, by definition, connote something that 
is ongoing? 
I think not—at least as the Court is using the term. Rather 
than being a needless redundancy once the word “emergency” is 
in play, the word “ongoing” is really the dominant word here. 
The difference between the statements at the beginning of the 
call in Davis and the statements at the end of the call (as well as 
those in Hammon) is not whether some kind of “emergency” 
existed (if we define that concept, as the dictionary does, as a 
                                                          
86 Id. at 2276. 
87 Id. 
88 Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2285-85 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
89 Id. at 2278. 
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set of circumstances that “calls for immediate action” or “a 
pressing need” for assistance).90 The difference is whether the 
events the caller was describing were “ongoing” or not. 
Accordingly, the word “emergency” is really just a more 
specific version of the word “events”—a natural focal point in 
the context of a 911 call since the general purpose of calling 911 
is to report emergencies. 
Some courts in the wake of Davis have already attained this 
insight. In State v. Kirby,91 for example, a man allegedly 
assaulted a woman, forced her into her car, and drove off. The 
woman managed to escape when the man pulled over to check a 
noise in the car, and she drove back home. She then reported 
and described the kidnapping on the phone to the police and told 
them she needed medical assistance. After the trial court allowed 
into evidence the entire 911 call, as well as an interview minutes 
later with responding officers, the State argued on appeal that 
the statements were nontestimonial because “an ongoing public 
safety emergency and a possible medical emergency” existed 
while the statements were made.92 
The Connecticut Supreme Court rejected this argument. The 
court reasoned that such an elastic definition of ongoing 
emergency “would render virtually any telephone report of a 
past violent crime in which the suspect was at large, no matter 
the timing of the call,” a report of an ongoing emergency and 
thus nontestimonial.93 Here, the victim’s statements “consisted 
of her account of what had happened to her in the recent past, 
rather than what was happening at the time of the call” and the 
ensuing on-the-scene interview.94 As such, they had to be 
considered testimonial. Other courts have resolved similar cases 
with like reasoning.95 
                                                          
90 WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 741 (1993). 
91 908 A.2d 506, 523 (Conn. 2006). 
92 Id. at  n.19. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. at 523; see also id. at 524 (showing an analysis of a on-the-scene 
interview). 
95 See, e.g., State v. Mechling, 633 S.E.2d 311, 323 (W. Va. 2006) 
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But many courts have resolved cases falling in between the 
facts of Davis and Hammon by applying expansive notions of the 
emergency concept, untethered to the res gestae doctrine. Some 
courts, notwithstanding Davis’ strong suggestion to the 
contrary,96 have held that a person’s statements describing past 
events to law enforcement are nontestimonial whenever a 
potentially violent assailant has fled the scene of the crime and is 
still on the loose.97 These holdings include decisions—directly 
contrary to the common law res gestae doctrine—that victims’ 
statements identifying who recently shot them are admissible.98 
Indeed, the New York Court of Appeals has explicitly held that 
the temporal nature of a responding officer’s questioning—there, 
asking “What happened?”—is irrelevant to whether a victim’s 
response is testimonial.99 So long, the court reasoned, as a 
responding officer is motivated more by a desire to assure public 
safety than to investigate a crime, anything a person says to him 
                                                          
(holding that a domestic violence victim’s statements to responding officers 
were not testimonial because there “was no emergency in progress when the 
officers arrived); State v. Parks, 142 P.3d 720, 721 (Ariz. App. 2006) 
(finding witness’s statement to responding officer was testimonial in part 
because the officer “was not seeking to determine ‘what is happening’ but 
rather ‘what happened.’”); State v. Cannon, 2006 WL 3787915 (Tenn. Crim. 
App. Dec. 27, 2006) (holding that statements to responding officers were 
testimonial because the officers “spoke with the victim in order to learn about 
past conduct and not in order to address an instantaneous emergency”); 
Santacruz v. State, 2006 WL 2506382 (Tex. App. Aug. 31, 2006) 
(concluding that statements in 911 call describing assault 10-15 minutes after 
events ended were testimonial). 
96 See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text. 
97 State v. Ayer, 2006 WL 3511787 (N.H. Dec. 7, 2007) (holding that 
witness’s statements to officers responding to a shooting were nontestimonial 
because the assailant “was loose”); State v. Camarena, 145 P.2d 267, 275 
(Or. App. 2006) (finding victim’s statements to officers were not testimonial, 
even though assailant had left, because he could have returned); State v. 
Washington, 2006 WL 3719447, at *4 (Minn. App. Dec. 19, 2006) 
(concluding that victim’s statements to responding officer were nontestimonial 
because “the assailant was still at large and posed an ongoing threat”). 
98 See United States v. Clemmons, 461 F.3d 1057 (8th Cir. 2006); Head 
v. State, 2006 WL 3489041 (Md. App. Dec. 5, 2006). 
99 People v. Bradley, 8 N.Y.3d 124 (N.Y. 2006). 
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is nontestimonial.100 
The problem with such decisions is that it is hard to 
understand how a state of emergency, standing alone, is enough 
to make a person’s description of criminal activity to a law 
enforcement agent nontestimonial. These courts are surely right 
that immediate law enforcement action is necessary whenever 
someone is in danger of incurring domestic violence or a 
potentially violent person is on the loose. In the parlance of 
Fourth Amendment law, such situations constitute “exigent 
circumstances.”101 
But the purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to regulate 
police officers, and the purpose of the exigent circumstances 
doctrine is to allow police officers to take actions (such as 
conducting warrantless searches) that they would not otherwise 
be allowed to take. Neither of these concerns has anything to do 
with the Confrontation Clause. The Confrontation Clause 
regulates trial procedures, and the purpose of the Clause is to 
                                                          
100 It is worth reproducing in full the critical passage of the court’s 
opinion: 
Defendant emphasizes that Mayfield’s question to Dixon was in 
the past tense: He said “what happened?” not “what’s 
happening?” From this, and from the fact that no attacker was in 
sight at the moment, defendant would have us infer, in the 
words of Davis, that “there [was] no . . . ongoing emergency, 
and that the primary purpose of the interrogation [was] to 
establish or prove past events. . . .” We do not find the 
inference a likely one. The officer’s purpose in questioning 
Dixon is shown more persuasively by the facts that came to his 
attention—a 911 call, a distressed and injured woman—and by 
the action he took after Dixon answered his question–entering 
the apartment, without lingering to find out more detail—than by 
his choice of tense. Any responsible officer in Mayfield’s 
situation would seek to assure Dixon’s safety first, and 
investigate the crime second. Because Dixon’s statement was 
made when the officer could reasonably have assumed, and 
apparently did assume, that he had an emergency to deal with, 
her statement was not testimonial under Crawford and Davis. 
Id. at 127-28. 
101 See Georgia v. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. 1515, 1525 (2006); Brigham 
City v. Staurt, 126 S. Ct. 1943, 1946-47 (2006). 
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ensure that prosecution witnesses testify in court. While the 
Fourth Amendment operates by means of an exclusionary rule in 
order to deter police misconduct, the Confrontation Clause 
operates by means of an exclusionary rule in order to safeguard 
the trial process. 
This explains why the Supreme Court acknowledged in 
Davis that “it is in the final analysis the declarants’ 
statements . . . that the Confrontation Clause requires us to 
evaluate.”102 The presence of an “ongoing emergency” is not 
important because it reveals police motives or allows officers to 
do something they otherwise would not have the power to do. 
Instead, the presence of an ongoing emergency is important only 
insofar as it indicates that a declarant’s statement describing 
criminal activity can fairly be described as part of the event 
itself, rather than a report or a narrative of it. If the law were 
otherwise, statements reporting serious criminal activity or 
accusing others of violent crimes would always be 
nontestimonial until a suspect was in custody and unable to 
cause further harm. Even more to the point, if the law were 
otherwise, Hammon would have had to come out the other way 
and the Court could never have indicated that the latter part of 
the 911 call in Davis was nontestimonial. Yet the emergencies in 
those cases were limited to the criminal events themselves, and 
when those events ceased occurring, statements describing how 
they had transpired were testimonial. 
B.  What a Witness Does 
The common law res gestae doctrine similarly informs 
Davis’ explanation that statements describing fresh criminal 
activity are testimonial when they mimic “what a witness does 
on direct examination”103—that is, when “the evidentiary 
products of the ex parte communication align perfectly with their 
courtroom analogues.”104 In particular, the Court reasoned that 
                                                          
102 Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct 2266, 2274 n.1 (2006). 
103 Id. at 2278. 
104 Id. at 2277. 
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Amy Hammon’s statements to the responding officers were 
testimonial because they were “an obvious substitute for live 
testimony.”105 By contrast, the Court explained that the 
statements at the beginning of the 911 call in Davis were not 
testimonial because “[n]o ‘witness’ goes into court to proclaim 
an emergency and seek help.”106 
Lower courts and commentators have been virtually silent 
concerning this strain of the Davis opinion, perhaps because they 
do not know what to make of it. One might say that what a 
witness does is give testimony under a highly formal and 
ritualized set of circumstances, and that absent such trappings a 
person is not providing a substitute for live testimony. On the 
other hand, one might say that what a witness does is relay his 
experiences and observations to another person, and that 
whenever a person does that in a manner later useful to a 
prosecution, the words are testimonial. The problem with each 
of these hypotheses, of course, is that the Court already has held 
that neither accurately captures the testimonial principle.107 
The key, once again, to unlocking the Court’s ambiguous 
guidance lies in its res gestae rhetoric. Right after the Court 
noted the resemblance between Amy Hammon’s statements and 
classic testimonial statements, the Court explained that her 
statements “deliberately recounted, in response to police 
questioning, how potentially criminal past events began and 
progressed.”108 Now that is what a witness does. A witness tells 
a person of authority what happened. 
That is what the 911 caller in Davis did in the second half of 
the call as well. While the caller used the present tense in the 
beginning of the call to describe events in progress, she used the 
past tense in the second part of the call to describe why and how 
Davis had assaulted her. We rarely term someone who is 
                                                          
105 Id. at 2278. 
106 Id. at 2277. 
107 Compare Id. at 2275 (describing how testimonial statements are not 
limited to those “of the most formal sort”) with Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1364 
(noting that “a person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance” is not 
a “witness”). 
108 Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2278. 
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describing ongoing events as a witness; such a person, even if 
speaking at some remove from the events, is more like a play-
by-play announcer. But we commonly call someone who tells a 
person at arms length what happened—even if it just finished 
happening and the declarant is still on the scene—a witness. 
Lest there be any doubt, think again, as the Court suggests, 
about what occurs during direct examination at a trial. Perhaps 
the most commonly asked question during direct examination in 
a criminal case is “what happened?” Indeed, the second most 
commonly asked question may be “what happened next?” In 
purely functional terms, anyone who answers these kinds of 
questions is acting like a witness—at least when the person 
asking the questions is a person of authority who is acting in 
that capacity. 
III.  BEYOND FRESH ACCUSATIONS TO LAW ENFORCEMENT 
Conceptualizing the confrontation right as interlocking with 
the res gestae doctrine not only brings clarity to the right in the 
realm of fresh accusations to agents of law enforcement, but it 
also sharpens our understanding of the right in other areas. 
Three types of statements, in particular, that have generated 
substantial litigation appear more clearly testimonial when 
analyzed through a res gestae lens: (1) statements to employees 
of private victims’ services organizations; (2) statements to 
medical personnel; and (3) children’s statements to their parents. 
Each of these categories of statements, of course, is worthy in 
its own right of a separate article. But it seems worthwhile to 
briefly sketch the implications of Davis’ res gestae approach for 
each. 
A.  Statements to Employees of Private Victims’ Services 
Organizations 
Recent years have seen a proliferation of privately operated 
victims’ services organizations—organizations such as sexual 
assault resource centers and child abuse assessment centers. All 
of these organizations work to some degree with law 
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enforcement, but none, by definition, is an actual arm of the 
government. The organizations are designed to offer comfort 
and support to crime victims and to help them navigate the legal 
process. An integral component of delivering those services, of 
course, is conducting detailed interviews and discussions with 
victims concerning what happened to them. 
The majority of courts since Crawford was decided have 
held that victims’ statements to private victims’ services 
personnel are testimonial, especially when such personnel 
interview victims in coordination with law enforcement.109 Some 
courts, however, have taken a different approach, holding that 
statements in these settings are not testimonial because they are 
made to nongovernmental personnel who are motivated more by 
therapeutic purposes than investigative or prosecutorial intent.110 
These assumptions that traditional law enforcement goals do not 
motivate private victims’ services organizations are certainly 
debatable. But it is hard to say that they are clearly wrong. 
Private victims’ services organizations try to accomplish a 
host of interrelated goals, and discerning which goal primarily 
motivates any single organization at any single moment is no 
easy task. If a court really wants to uphold the admissibility of a 
statement to such an organization, there is very little in an 
abstract “primary purpose” inquiry that squarely forecloses that 
result. 
One might argue in response to these concerns, as Rich 
Friedman does, that if we put purposes aside and ask whether a 
                                                          
109 See State v. Blue, 717 N.W.2d 558 (N.D. 2006) (reporting 
statements to private forensic interviewer working “in concert with or as an 
agent of” the police); People v. Sharp, ___ P.3d ___, 2006 WL 3635393 
(Colo. App. Dec. 14, 2006); State v. Pitt, 147 P.3d 930 (Or. App. 2006); 
People v. Sisavath, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753 (Cal. App. 2004) (describing child’s 
statement to child interview specialist at private victim assessment center); In 
re Rolandis G., 817 N.E.2d 183 (Ill. App. 2004) (detailing child’s statements 
to private child abuse investigator). 
110 See State v. Cannon, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2006 WL 3787915 (Tenn. 
Crim. App. Dec. 27, 2006) (describing rape victim’s statement to sexual 
assault center employee working in conjunction with police not testimonial); 
People v. Geno, 261 Mich. App. 624 (2004) (noting that a child’s statement 
to director of Children’s Assessment Center was not testimonial). 
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reasonable declarant would have “anticipated” that her 
statements would be available for prosecutorial use, then the 
answer is clearly “yes” and the declarant’s statements are thus 
clearly testimonial.111 But even assuming that Davis permits 
courts to base their decisions on declarants’ reasonable 
anticipations, this expectation-based inquiry still seems 
inadequate to deal with these kinds of statements. Whenever 
courts are given license to surmise⎯based usually on little or no 
direct evidence—what was (or reasonably would have been) in 
an actor’s mind, courts are bound to reach inconsistent results. 
Any court intent in reaching a particular result can simply 
pronounce what a certain actor would have anticipated, and 
there is no firm proof that an aggrieved party can bring forward 
to challenge that result. 
More importantly, the reasonable anticipation test—at least 
standing alone—appears to lead to unacceptable results. Imagine 
that the police set up, or invite an existing enterprise to operate 
as, what I will call an “undercover” victims’ services 
organization. The organization advertises itself as strictly a 
counseling establishment, and tells victims that nothing they say 
there will be transmitted to law enforcement or is allowed to be 
introduced in a court of law. Under such circumstances, one 
would be hard pressed to say that a reasonable declarant talking 
to such an organization would anticipate that their statements 
could be used as a substitute for their live testimony in court. 
Yet it seems palpably incorrect to say that their statements 
would not be testimonial. 
The res gestae analysis in Davis makes these tricky cases 
easy. Whatever may be in the declarants’ or questioners’ minds 
when they participate in interviews at private victims’ services 
centers, it is undeniable that the declarants are doing exactly 
what a witness does. They are recounting past events to a person 
of authority. The statements are entirely removed from the 
events themselves. And, in the words of Davis, “the evidentiary 
products” of these interviews “align[] perfectly with their 
                                                          
111 Richard D. Friedman, Grappling with the Meaning of “Testimonial,” 
71 BROOK. L. REV. 241, 251-53 (2005). 
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courtroom analogues.”112 It thus is plain that the declarant’s 
statements are testimonial. 
B.  Statements to Medical Personnel 
Statements that people make to doctors and nurses who are 
at least in part treating their injuries present similar issues. 
Medical services personnel are typically private employees but 
they also often work in conjunction with law enforcement. 
Sometimes police officers accompany or direct suspected victims 
of crime to the hospital and explicitly ask doctors or nurses to 
collect evidence. Even when police officers are not so directly 
involved at the time medical examinations take place, many 
doctors and nurses operate as specialists designed to look for 
signs of certain crimes, such as sexual assaults or child abuse. 
Nearly all doctors and nurses perform their duties under state 
laws that require them to report cases of suspected abuse to the 
police.113 
As in the context of private victims’ services organizations, 
courts are divided over whether statements describing criminal 
activity to medical personnel are testimonial. Most, but not all 
courts have held that when the police are directly involved in 
presenting the injured party for the examination, the injured 
party’s statements are testimonial.114 
But absent such explicit involvement, the vast majority of 
                                                          
112 Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2277. 
113 See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 81 (2001) 
(referencing and approving of such laws). 
114 See People v. Harless, 125 Cal. App. 4th 70 (2004), rev. granted, 
109 P.3d 69 (Cal.), rev. dismissed, 119 P.3d 962 (Cal. 2005) (finding 
statement to doctor “in the course of the district attorney’s investigation of 
child abuse” testimonial); State v. Krasky, 721 N.W.2d 916 (Minn. App. 
2006) (same). But see State v. Stahl, 855 N.E.2d 834 (Ohio 2006) (holding 
in a 4-3 opinion that rape victim’s statement to nurse collecting rape kit in 
coordination with police not testimonial); Commonwealth v. DeOliveira, 849 
N.E.2d 218 (Mass. 2006) (finding child’s statements to doctor examining for 
signs of abuse after the police were involved were not testimonial, but state 
law excluded identification of perpetrator so court did not address whether 
those statements would have been testimonial). 
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courts have held that statements to doctors or nurses—even when 
they are expressly asking questions to determine whether a 
patient has been criminally harmed—are nontestimonial.115 These 
courts reason that medical personnel are primarily interested in 
attending to the health and safety of the people they examine, 
and that people telling treating physicians and nurses how they 
were injured would not expect those statements to be used in a 
criminal prosecution. 
Consider the Minnesota Court of Appeals’ decision in In the 
Matter of A.J.A.116 Parents of a five-year-old suspected that he 
had been abused and called the police. The detective who came 
to the house, after consulting with the local prosecutor’s office, 
suggested to the parents that they take their son to a local 
                                                          
115 See People v. Vigil, 127 P.3d 916 (Colo. 2006) (showing a child’s 
statements to physician examining for signs of abuse not testimonial); State v. 
Scacchetti, 711 N.W.2d 508 (Minn. 2006) (showing the same in nurse’s 
examination at hospital unit designed to examine for signs of abuse); State v. 
Brigman, 632 S.E.2d 498 (N.C. App. 2006) (noting that a child’s statements 
to doctor examining for signs of abuse not testimonial); Griner v. State, 899 
A.2d 189 (Md. App. 2006) (demonstrating that a child’s statements to nurse 
after police involved not testimonial); Hobgood v. State, 926 So.2d 847 
(Miss. 2006) (showing that a statement to pediatrician was nontestimonial, 
although had police been involved when examination took place, “then it 
might be possible for the statements to implicate the Confrontation Clause); 
United States v. Peneaux, 432 F.3d 882 (8th Cir. 2005) (noting that a child’s 
statements to a doctor wholly unconnected to law enforcement were not 
testimonial); State v. Vaught, 682 N.W. 2d 284 (Neb. 2004) (holding that 
statement to doctor identifying perpetrator was not testimonial because “there 
was [no] indication of government involvement in the initiation or course of 
the examination”); State v. Moses, 119 P.3d 906 (Wash. App. 2005) (same); 
Foley v. State, 914 So.2d 677 (Miss. 2005) (same); People v. Cage, 15 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 846 (Cal. App. 2004) (same), rev. granted (Cal. 2004); State v. 
Fisher, 108 P.3d 1262 (Wash. App. 2005); State v. Lee, 2005 WL 544837 
(Ohio. App. March 9, 2005) (same), appeal allowed, 836 N.E.2d 1227 (Ohio 
2005). But see Medina v. State, 143 P.3d 471 (Nev. 2006) (holding that 
statements to medical personnel examining for signs of abuse are testimonial 
because such personnel are required to report suspicions to law enforcement); 
In re T.T., 815 N.E.2d 789 (Ill. App. 2004) (noting that statements 
“identifying respondent as perpetrator” were testimonial, but statements 
describing physical condition were not). 
116 2006 WL 2474267 (Minn. App. Aug. 29, 2006). 
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medical clinic that performed child abuse evaluations. The 
parents did so. 
At the clinic, medical personnel conducted a detailed 
physical and oral evaluation, at which the child told a nurse that 
the defendant touched him inappropriately. Although there were 
no physical signs of abuse, the nurse reported the child’s 
allegations to the police pursuant to the state’s mandatory 
reporting requirement. After the trial court held that these 
statements could not be admitted in the absence of the alleged 
victim testifying at trial, the appellate court reversed on the 
grounds that the interviewer’s primary purpose was to ensure the 
child’s health, safety, and well-being, and the child would not 
have anticipated his statements would have been available for 
later use at a trial.117 
For anyone who cares about protecting the confrontation 
right, this result should be deeply troubling. By referring a 
suspected victim of abuse to a medical facility, the police and 
local prosecutor were able to generate a detailed statement that 
they could use to prosecute the alleged abuser without ever 
giving the defendant a chance to question his accuser. Law 
enforcement, in effect, designed a system (an easily replicable 
one, at that) in which someone accusing another of crime never 
needed to testify in court. 
Even taking away this direct governmental involvement, 
allowing the state to introduce the child’s statement to the nurse 
without putting the child on the stand poses profound Sixth 
Amendment problems. Especially when considered against the 
backdrop of mandatory reporting laws, allowing such a 
procedure threatens to turn doctors and nurses into surrogate 
witnesses in child abuse and possibly other types of cases. The 
role of medical personnel would not be altogether different from 
interrogating magistrates’ under the Marian statutes, whose job 
it was to conduct ex parte investigatory interviews with 
witnesses in felony cases and to certify the results to the court, 
so the court could decide how to proceed and whether to detain 
                                                          
117 Id. 
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the suspects pending trial.118 
But neither a “primary purpose” test nor a “reasonable 
anticipation” standard clearly illuminates why these kinds of 
statements to medical personnel should be considered 
testimonial. It is obviously true that doctors and nurses are 
interested in safeguarding health and well-being, and it is 
foolhardy if not impossible to assess how exactly that interest 
interlocks with effective law enforcement or when one thing 
predominates over the other. It also is at least debatable when 
reasonable people receiving a medical evaluation would 
anticipate that their descriptions to treating doctors and nurses 
would expect that the descriptions would be available for use in 
an ensuing criminal investigation or trial. 
Once again, Davis’ res gestae analysis brings the picture into 
clearer focus. When a person submits to a detailed and 
structured interview with someone who is trying, at least in part, 
to discern whether they have been criminally harmed, that 
should be all we need to know. The declarant is not under any 
immediate threat and is narrating purely past events. 
Furthermore, the evidentiary product that results is functionally 
equivalent to testimony on direct examination. Even if certain 
snippets of medical interviews—such as descriptions of physical 
symptoms—are nontestimonial, descriptions, as Davis puts it, of 
“how potentially criminal past events began and progressed”119 
and especially who perpetrated them, must be considered 
testimonial. 
C.  Children’s Statements to Parents 
Under the reliability-based framework of Ohio v. Roberts,120 
most states enacted special hearsay exceptions to deal with 
childrens’ allegations of abuse. Generally speaking, these 
exceptions provided that any allegation of abuse was admissible 
in a criminal case, so long as the trial court deemed the 
                                                          
118 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43-44, 53 (discussing the Marian statutes). 
119 Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2278 (2006). 
120 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
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allegation sufficiently “trustworthy.”121 Moreover, such out-of-
court allegations could be—and routinely were—introduced even 
when courts later deemed the child-declarants incompetent to 
testify at trial because they did not know the difference between 
a truth and a lie.122 
In the wake of Crawford, every court to address the issue 
has held that allegations of abuse made to police officers or 
other governmental personnel associated with law enforcement 
(personnel often specially trained to interview children) are 
testimonial.123 At the same time, courts uniformly have held that 
a child’s statements to family members (usually parents, but 
sometimes other relatives) describing abuse are nontestimonial, 
at least when made before the police are involved.124 Courts 
                                                          
121 See Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.44.120. 
122 For one example of such a case, see State v. C.J., 63 P.3d 765 
(Wash. 2003), in which the court held that a child’s allegations of abuse to 
his mother and a police officer were admissible even though the child was 
incompetent to testify and was “unable to characterize the difference between 
truthful and false statements.” Id. at 767. 
123 See, e.g., Flores v. State, 120 P.3d 1170 (Nev. 2005) (utilizing 
statements made to a police officer); People v. Vigil, 127 P.3d 916 (Colo. 
2006) (utilizing statements made to a police officer); Hobgood v. State, 926 
So. 2d 847 (Miss. 2006) (same); United States v. Bordeaux, 400 F.3d 548 
(8th Cir. 2005) (utilizing statements to “forensic interviewer” testimonial); 
People v. Warner, 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d 419 (Cal. App. 2004) (working with 
statements made to a child interview specialist); L.J.K. v. State, 942 So. 2d 
854 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005) (same). 
124 See, e.g., Hobgood v. State, 926 So.2d 847 (Miss. 2006) (noting that 
statements to police were testimonial but not statements to relatives before 
police were involved); In re Rolandis G., 817 N.E.2d at 186 (holding that 
statement to mother were not testimonial where “[t]here is no indication that 
[mother] suspected he had been the victim of a crime and that she was 
attempting to elicit evidence for a future prosecution”); People v. R.F., 2005 
WL 323718 (Ill. App. Feb. 10, 2005) (concluding in a divided decision that 
child’s accusation to mother and grandmother was not testimonial); State v. 
Walker, 118 P.3d 935 (Wash. App. 2005) (holding that statement to child’s 
mother was not testimonial); State v. Shafer, 128 P.3d 87 (Wash. 2006) 
(showing same regarding statements to mother and family friend). Appellate 
courts have not yet grappled with situations in which family members have 
elicited statements from children after the police are involved for use in a 
criminal prosecution, but it is not hard to imagine such a scenario and why it 
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have distinguished between statements made to governmental 
personnel and those made to family members on the grounds 
that only the former are associated with law enforcement and 
people would not expect that statements made to family 
members would be used for investigatory or prosecutorial 
purposes. 
Even accepting those assumptions as correct, Davis provides 
reason for questioning the accuracy of courts’ holdings that 
childrens’ descriptions to parents of past abuse are always 
nontestimonial. Childrens’ statements describing abuse—
especially when the product of probing questioning by parents—
function quite nicely as a “‘weaker substitute for live testimony’ 
at trial.”125 Children are doing exactly with their parents what a 
witness does with a lawyer in court: answering questions 
designed to elicit whether they have been criminally harmed 
and, if so, to describe how that that harm occurred. While 
parents are not governmental actors, they are people of authority 
in their children’s eyes—the people to complain to when 
something is wrong and needs to be fixed.126 
The Davis opinion, in fact, favorably discusses a Founding-
era English case that supports this analysis. In King v. 
Brasier,127 a child, “immediately upon her coming home,” told 
her mother that she had been sexually assaulted and described 
“all the circumstances of the injury which had been done to 
her.”128 The next day, she identified a neighbor as her attacker. 
The King’s Bench held that the child’s statements were 
                                                          
would raise serious questions. Cf. State v. Brigman, 615 S.E.2d 21 (N.C. 
App. 2005) (holding that foster mother’s taped interview with child was not 
testimonial). 
125 Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2277 (2006) (quoting United 
States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 394 (2006)). 
126 Indeed, the common law res gestae cases even excluded adults’ 
statements describing completed criminal events to other private parties, in 
part because the statements bore such a close functional resemblance to 
testimony on direct examination. See supra  notes 37-63 and accompanying 
text. 
127 1 Leach 199, 168 Eng. Rep. 202 (1779). 
128 Id. at 200. 
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inadmissible in the absence of the child taking the stand at trial, 
for “no testimony whatever”—apparently including out-of-court 
testimonial statements”—can be legally received except upon 
oath.”129 The Supreme Court in Davis accepted this holding, 
indicating that the child’s statement to her mother was 
testimonial—as opposed to the 911 caller’s description of 
ongoing events—because “by the time the victim got home, her 
story was an account of past events.”130 That is, the statement 
was not part of the res gestae. 
Some appellate courts may think that classifying childrens’ 
accusations such as these as testimonial would lead to harsh or 
even unacceptable results. Child abuse is a horrible crime, the 
thinking goes, and many guilty people might not be prosecuted 
if the government were unable to introduce their out-of-court 
accusations as substantive evidence in trials. This is a highly 
emotional and intellectually challenging problem. But let me put 
two propositions on the table that somewhat mollify the impact 
of Davis’ suggestion that many childrens’ descriptions of abuse 
are testimonial. 
First, precisely because child abuse is such a deplorable 
crime, we should be vigilant about protecting a few basic 
procedural rights, lest our passions get the best of us. Imagine 
for a moment that the neighbor in Brasier was innocent and that 
the child’s uncle actually assaulted her, but the child was afraid 
to tell her mother this because her uncle was her mother’s 
brother. I think we would all agree that if the statements were 
admitted and accepted, the trial would have caused a grave 
miscarriage of justice. By far the best chance for avoiding that 
injustice would have been requiring confrontation. Prosecutors, 
in short, will sometimes pursue charges based on untrue 
accusations, and we need to have a way of ferreting those cases 
out. 
Second, it is important to recognize that the confrontation 
problem in a large percentage of these cases appears to be one 
of the government’s own making. Children who tell their parents 
                                                          
129 Id. 
130 Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2277. 
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they have been abused are unable to testify in court because 
state laws, in the form of competency requirements, say they are 
unable to testify. The Supreme Court has never decided whether 
such competency requirements render children “unavailable” for 
purposes of the Confrontation Clause.131 But even if they do, I 
am not aware of any constitutional reason why states need to 
demand that children understand an oath or even that they 
demonstrate that they know the difference between a truth and a 
lie in order to testify in court. The Confrontation Clause may 
well require an oath when possible, but as with the requirement 
that witnesses testify at the trial itself, this requirement may not 
be unyielding when at least cross-examination is possible. 
Indeed, it strikes me as rather perverse for states so willingly to 
accept the legitimacy of children’s out-of-court narratives while 
simultaneously deeming that anything they might say in court—
where the defendant would actually have a chance to ask 
questions too—would be useless. By relaxing competency 
requirements, states could not only foster the introduction of 
evidence at child abuse trials, but also provide defendants with a 
way of challenging that evidence and the jury with a means for 
assessing it. 
CONCLUSION 
The lesson of the failed Roberts framework is that the 
confrontation right needs to be protected with doctrine that 
reflects confrontation values. Courts should heed that lesson 
when interpreting and applying the Davis decision. Assessing 
simply whether an “emergency” existed while a person 
described potentially criminal events does not meaningfully help 
determine whether introducing the person’s statement in a 
criminal trial would make the person a “witness” against the 
                                                          
131 The Court expressly reserved this issue in Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 
805, 816 (1990). This issue has not only Sixth Amendment implications, but 
Due Process implications as well, since a defendant has a constitutional right 
to put witnesses on the stand who are necessary to presenting a defense. See 
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973). 
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defendant. Nor does examining any questioner’s primary 
purpose in eliciting such an out-of-court statement materially 
assist in that inquiry. Rather, the best way to determine whether 
introducing a fresh accusation—or any other out-of-court 
statement describing potentially criminal events—against a 
criminal defendant triggers the Confrontation Clause is to ask 
whether the person was narrating completed events to a person 
of authority. That is what a “witness” does and what Davis 
describes as producing testimonial evidence. 
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Appendix A 
Transcript of 911 Call in Davis132 
This is Liz Hennekay of the Valley Communications Center. 
Today’s date is February 6, 2001, and the time is 1340 hours. 
The following taped incident has been recorded from the Valley 
Communications master disk of February 1, 2001 at 1154 hours. 
 
911 Operator: 911.  Hello, 911. 
[unknown] [Hang up]. . .[unintelligible] 
[new phone call; ringing] 
911 Operator: Hello. 
Complainant: Hello. 
911 Operator: What’s going on? 
Complainant: He’s here jumpin’ on me again. 
911 Operator: Okay. Listen to me carefully. Are  you in a 
 house or an apartment? 
Complainant: I’m in a house. 
911 Operator: Are there any weapons? 
Complainant: No. He’s usin’ his fists. 
911 Operator: Okay. Has he been drinking? 
Complainant: No. 
911 Operator: Okay, sweetie. I’ve got help started. 
 Stay on the line with me, okay? 
Complainant: I’m on the line. 
911 Operator: Listen to me carefully. Do you know his   
                                                          
132 This appears at pages 8-13 of the Joint Appendix in Davis. 
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 last name? 
 
Complainant: It’s Davis. 
911 Operator: Davis? Okay, what’s his first name? 
Complainant: Adran 
911 Operator: What is it? 
Complainant: Adrian. 
911 Operator: Adrian? 
Complainant: Yeah. 
911 Operator: Okay. What’s his middle initial? 
Complainant: Martell. He’s runnin’ now. 
[unintelligible] 
911 Operator: Listen, listen. What direction is  running? 
Complainant: He’s in a car. 
911 Operator: What car? 
Complainant: I don’t know. 
911 Operator: What color? 
Complainant: It’s blue or gray or somethin’. 
911 Operator: What direction? 
Complainant: He’s riding up the street. 
911 Operator: Okay.  What direction? 
Complainant: Goin’ down, this is a dead-end street. 
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911 Operator: It’s a dead-end street, so he’s going out the 
  dead end? 
Complainant: Yeah. 
911 Operator: Is he alone? 
Complainant: No. 
911 Operator: How many people in the car with him? 
Complainant: I don’t know. He just ran out the door 
  after he hit me. 
911 Operator: Okay. Do you need an aid car? 
Complainant: No, I’m all right. 
911 Operator: Okay sweetie. 
[redaction] 
911 Operator: Stop talking and answer my questions. 
Complainant: All right. 
911 Operator: Okay. Do you know his birth date? 
Complainant: 8/13/65. 
911 Operator: Okay, I’m having trouble understanding 
   you. 
Complainant: 8/13/65. I’ve gotta close my door. My. . . 
[child’s voice in background] [unintelligible] 
Child: Hi Daddy. 
911 Operator: Hi. Can I talk your mommy? 
Child: Yeah. 
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911 Operator: Okay. Go get mommy. Thank you,  
   sweetie. 
Child: [unintelligible] 
911 Operator: Okay. Go get mommy. 
[child’s voice in background] [unintelligible] 
2nd Child: Hello. 
911 Operator: Hi. Where’s the grownup in the house. 
2nd Child: [unintelligible]  my mommy. 
911 Operator: Where’s your mommy. Is she inside or 
  outside the house? 
2nd Child: Uh, walking(?). 
911 Operator: She’s where. 
Complainant: Hello. 
911 Operator: Hi. We’re gonna check the area first, 
  okay? And then they’re gonna come talk to  
   you. Is this your ex-husband or a   
   boyfriend? 
Complainant: Yes. 
911 Operator: Well, which one—ex-husband? 
Complainant: Boyfriend. 
911 Operator: Okay, sweetie. Did he force his way into 
   the house—or. . . 
Complainant: No.  I’m movin’ today. He said he was 
   comin’ to get his stuff. Somebody else  
   came over here, so he tried arguing with  
   me about that. So then I told him,  “Look,  
   I gotta go. You gotta go.” 
911 Operator: Um-hmm. 
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Complainant: So then he jumped up and started beating  
   me up in front of him. I don’t know what  
   he was trying to prove. 
911 Operator: Okay, . . . 
[redaction] 
Complainant: . . . I told him not to come. 
911 Operator: Okay. 
Complainant: I told him over and over. 
911 Operator: Okay. Okay. Take a deep breath. I need to  
   find out restraining order, so I need your  
   last name. What is it? 
Complainant: M-c-C-o-t-t-r-y. 
911 Operator: M-c-C-o-r-t. . . 
Complainant: M-c-C-o-t-t-r-y. 
911 Operator: Okay. And your first name? 
Complainant: Michelle. 
911 Operator: Michelle. And your middle initial? 
Complainant: I don’t have one. 
911 Operator: Okay. What’s your birth date. 
Complainant: 5/10/69. 
911 Operator: Okay. Is your door locked? 
Complainant: Yes. 
911 Operator: Okay. 
[redaction] 
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911 Operator: . . . put that in the call. They’re gonna  
   check the area for him first, and then  
   they’re gonna come talk to you.  Okay. 
Complainant: All right. 
911 Operator: Okay. Bye-bye. 
